Neal Conan: In the days after September 11, Americans began asking questions that still haunt US intelligence officials. Why didn't we do a better job tracking down Osama bin Ladin? Did we know there were terrorists among us? Why didn't we stop them? Those insistent questions led to the creation of the 9/11 Commission which issued its report a year ago. Now there's new information about an elite Army intelligence unit code-named "Able Danger" that linked Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers to an Al Qaeda cell in New York before the attacks, charges that meetings were set up to pass that intelligence on to the FBI, and that those meetings were then blocked by military lawyers. We'll talk with a 22-year veteran of the group that had oversight of the Able Danger unit and we'll hear from Thomas Kean, Chairman of the 9/11 Commission... Joining us is Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, former chief of Task for Stratus Ivy [?] who supported the Able Danger intelligence unit...
Neal Conan: First of all, explain what Able Danger was, and your role in it. Lt. Col. Anthony
Shaffer: Essentially, Able Danger was a global targeting effort to look at all aspects of Al Qaeda as an organization. As you can imagine that's a very daunting task! Not something easily done. We knew back in the late '90's that this was a growing threat and because of that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Hugh Shelton, had asked Operations Command to essentially look at how we could conduct operations on order to begin to try to understand the nature of Al Qaeda, how it functions, what it does, and then be able on call -- that is to say, when it's determined by leadership -- to do something to counter the operations and stop them from being able to do attacks.
Conan: And the systems that were used, I understand you're not an intelligence analyst, but the systems that were used were data mining -- or one of the systems.
Shaffer: One of the systems we're talking about in this case, and let me be clear on this there are still a number of aspects of Able Danger which are still highly classified which obviously we won't get into, but the one issue we can talk about here is the fact that yes, data mining and using -- by the estimate of the doctor who put it all together -- 2.5 kerabytes of information, all what we consider open source (not classified government computers) in which using smart algorithms, looking for patterns within that amorphous data, and then pulling those patterns out and trying to have intelligence analysts make their best judgment as to certify or decertify the linkages established by those algorithms.
Conan: And this linkage analysis, you say, identified Mohammed Atta and three other of the 9/11 hijackers with an Al Qaeda cell in Brooklyn.
Shaffer: That's correct. And this is one of the key issues regarding some of the bantering going on right now. Able Danger was not about locations and times. It was about linkages and associations. It was about what we saw in the data that showed that these guys had traits similar to other guys who had conducted terrorrist operations [break in broadcast].. in the past...[...] and in Brooklyn.
Conan: Now this information the unit wanted to pass on to the FBI.
Shaffer: That's correct. That's also where I came into the picture again because the -- I'm a supporting organization helping them do their job -- internally there was a debate about what to do about the individuals who were "U.S. persons." Now, "U.S. persons" defined back in that era was anyone who was here legally and who had the same rights and privileges as you or me. And that restriction gives you the right to privacy. You're not going to be scrutinized or have things happen to you in this case without due cause. These individuals were given the same rights and privileges as any of us, and therefore the lawyers at the time said... Keep in mind we have a lot of hits on terrorists, not just these guys there... But for the guys here in the US, somehow located here, we have to leave them alone or pretend they don't exist.
Conan: Because... Well, as far as anybody knew, they were in the country legally and they were protected.
Shaffer: That's correct. That was the thinking of the time by the lawyers, yes.
Conan: Okay. Now, obviously things move on. 9/11 happens. You were then approached sometime afterwards by the 9/11 Commission. You were then in Afghanistan.
Shaffer: That's correct. The time the 9/11 Commission -- Mr. Zelikow -- came to visit, I was there as the Operations Chief of... He came with two staffers and an Executive Branch lawyer and when he visited there -- I was there working as Operations Officer for Defense Humint there on the ground at Bagram. And [...] asked Hey, does anyone have information that may be relevant to the pre-9/11 era of counter-terrorism, and of course I volunteered through the chain of command, the Commanding General, and said I have this information. And he said -- and he validated this -- and he said yes, I think you should talk to the Commission staffers. And at that point in time, I put together a two-page talking point paper in which I laid out all of the issues which you now see swirling around in the news regarding Able Danger. Obviously there are some other things which are more classified which I'm not talking to anyone about. But we're talking essentiallly about the open-source data mining and the methodology using the -- and I might add this, the Army's land information warfare activity -- using their technology and their location which essentially produced this outcome regarding the Brooklyn cell.
Conan: As you know, the 9/11 Commission has said, Look, we've gone through the notes that our staff members took at that interview in Afghanistan and we didn't hear the name Mohammed Atta.
Shaffer: You know, I don't know what exactly they heard because I've read their 12 August reponse to my comments. They attribute things to me which I never said, like something about me complaining about Congress and the Permanent House Select Committee on Intelligence, and I never said anything the Permanent House Select Committee on Intelligence, not in my notes, nor did I say that Able Danger was focused -- it's right there in the paragraph -- about Al Qaeda [...] activities in Afghanistan before 9/11referred to a program referred to as Able Danger [Shaffer speaks rapidly and with apparent irritation or excitement, hard to understand over a phoneline and on tape] but I didn't do that. I simply talked about Able Danger being a global targeting program of Al Qaeda. So this concerns me that this paragraph here describing their meeting with me can be so far off -- by the fact that I had my "bullets" and what I talked about. The bottom bullet after I talked about the technology and who all was involved, we found two of the three cells which conducted 9/11 [...] Now, I don't know if it was so located and recognized but I can tell you that at the time I said what I did, there was a great deal of interest. People perked up and I talked about one hour and fifteen minutes. And in addition to that -- after we got done with the discussion -- I was asked by Mr. Zelikow himself to recontact the Commission upon leaving my tour in Afghanistan and when I returned to Washington. Gave me his card. One of the other staffers gave me his card and then asked me to please contact them when I got back.
Conan: We've been unable to reach Mr. Zelikow because he works at the State Department. We've left messages. In a moment we're going to be talking with Tom Kean who's the Chairman of the 9/11 Commission. And I do need to ask you: there are differing accounts of what you told them and what its significance is.
Shaffer: Well, the significance to me is they were very interested in the beginning. Apparently they did... if you're the individual and you're looking at Al Qaeda and all the aspects of what led to the attack I would think learning of a program that talked about Al Qaeda a year in advance of the attack would be of significance. And I would cite to you their own, again, 12 August response when they talked about.. "After the meeting, the Commission staff promptly prepared a memo..." and yadda yadda yadda... and then "in Afghanistan Dr. Zelikow called back to the Commission's headquarters in Washington and requested the information about Able Danger." So something prompted him to take immediate action. So, again, I don't know what exactly the recollection is. I haven't talked to them. My recollection is, obviously, I said something which had them give an instant response to try to get the information. And then again, following up, coming back again and talking to them and offering up a full set of the Able Danger documents which I had in my possession in my office.
Conan: And finally, Col. Shaffer...
Shaffer: ...yup...
Conan:.. it's almost four years after 9/11. Why is this coming out now?
Shaffer: Excellent question and I want this to be very clear. Congressman Waldon was approached by the DOD. I've been working with the Navy to resurrect a certain aspect of Able Danger capability, specifically the data mining capability. The Navy is interested in trying to recreate some of those capabilities to do the data mining and massive parallel processing, etc. etc. As part of that process, one of the things I was sent over to do was request money, to informally talk to the Congressman about getting money for the project. It was during these discussions talking about how we were going to do the project that he started questioning both the Navy officer and myself about, well, what happened to the original project. And that's where it came up about the fact that we did talk to the 9/11 Commission about that stuff and we figured everybody knew about it. Then Congressman Weldon started doing investigations. My hat's off to him. He actually was the one who kind of uncovered all this stuff. He found out that the Commission had not been briefed and that there was apparently no real mention made of Able Danger in the final report. That, I think, was troubling to him and I think that's why we're at where we are now. Because he did his speech on the floor of the house and that was picked up. My objective here is to recreate and make sure we have the capabilities which will help us to prevent the next 9/11. That is the only reason I'm doing this.
Conan:... like Able Danger.
Shaffer: Yes, exactly. And unfortunately, for whatever reason, it has become a major issue. Believe me, sir, after today I have no desire to go down this path. It is exhausting. But it has to be done in my view because I think information has to get out and I think we have to account for why some of these things weren't looked at as part of the overall Report.
Conan:..Col. Shaffer, thank you very much for being with us.... With us on the phone now is the former governnor of New Jersey and the former Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean. It's good of you to be with us.
Kean: Thank you. It's good to be with you.
Conan: I know you've been listening to at least the last few second of what Col. Shaffer had to say. What's your response?
Kean: I haven't got a response. I mean I don't know and couldn't say. I wasn't in any meeting with Col. Shaffer, don't know any of the information he's talking about. None of the information he's talking about was presented to the Commission.
Conan: None of it was.
Kean: No. What we do have is a meeting, which he refers to which was held in Afghanistan. There were four people there beside Col. Shaffer, three from our staff, one from the White House. The question of Able Danger was brought up. Our staff -- none of them heard the name Mohammed Atta or they would have reacted.[station break]
Conan: Governor Kean, there is a dispute between your staff members who had the interview with Col. Shaffer and his recollection that the name Mohammed Atta was then mentioned. But I wanted to ask you about another aspect of this. The idea that this unit, Able Danger, wanted to pass this information along to the FBI and, according to Col. Shaffer, was prevented from doing so.
Kean: He's right and that was obviously a great mistake. We don't know about that. There is none of that in the files. What happened when our staff learned of Able Danger, as we did with everything else we requested documents, anything to do with Able Danger from the Pentagon. And from the Administration. The Administration turned over a whole series of documents which they said was everything having to do with Able Danger. We then made a second request and we haven't gotten anything now from the second request or anything else having to do with Able Danger! They said, We've given you everything. So we had every document having to do with Able Danger. Unless the Administration, for whatever reason, withheld information which we hope they didn't.
Conan: It should be pointed out that the Administration turned over documents to you that did not make them look all that great! Kean: Oh yes! And this wasn't even about them. This goes back to the Clinton administration. Why the administration or the Pentagon would have withheld documents... I mean it seems strange to me. There was nothing in those documents. And we went over them again because, since this all came up, we sent the staff in to look at the documents again to make sure there was nothing about Mohammed Atta. Nothing about a Brooklyn cell. Nothing in those documents. And so all we can do on the Commission is to say, These are the facts. We didn't draw a lot of conclusions other than recommendations. The facts in this case -- his recollection of the meeting is different from the four other people who were there. And the four other people who were there don't remember the name of Mohammed Atta, don't remember the discussion the same way. It could be they're mistaken! Four of them -- one from the White House and three from the staff feel that way and the documents we've been able to get and review again. That's because we went back in the files and had a look -- that is, the staff did last week -- don't seem to bear out some of the things that have been said. Having said that, that's all we know! The Commission itself got no information beyond what's in the files.
Conan: Let me ask you: there was also a published report today about State Department documents referring to Osama bin Ladin's move from Sudan to Afghanistan back in July 1996, a warning from a State Department analyst saying bin Ladin may be more dangerous in Afghanistan than he even was in Sudan. This was brought out by a lawsuit filed by Judicial Watch. We're going to hear from them a little big later in the program. Were you aware of that document?
Kean: I wasn't aware of that document. I was aware that a lot of people felt that way. I mean this was not just whatever document came out here. We say that actually in the Commission Report. It was a great mistake to allow bin Ladin to leave and get to Afghanistan and I think everyone has acknowledged that, both people in government and outside government. The Times said that, and we should get him now! So this is nothing new.
Conan: Is there any way should Col. Shaffer's charges turn out to be accurate... there's no way at this point to resurrect the Commission...
Kean: We have up to 2000 documents. We showed the American people every fact we had. We've gone out of existence. We have a small group we've maintained with private funds to try to pursue the recommendations the Commission made to make the American people safer. And that's what we're pursuing now. But the Commission itself has been out of existence for a long time. If there's any documentation of any kind to support what Col. Shaffer is saying then I think that Congressman Weldon or our committee could look into it. This would certainly be news to us, but a very important part of the puzzle if in fact the Pentagon knew something about the movements of Mohammed Atta, tried to pass it on to other government agencies, and was not allowed to. That would be a very important allegation, very important fact. And if there's anything to back it up, the Pentagon should be able to answer questions on it. We don't have that information. The Pentagon does. The Administration does. If there's any accuracy to them at all, we should be hearing from the Administration.
Conan: Governor Kean, thank you very much for being with us.
Part 2, including interviews with Harry "Skip" Brandon who worked with the FBI, and Thomas Fitton of Judicial Watch, will be posted soon.