But do we have, as Thomas Powers puts it in a coruscating essay, "the civic courage"?
Writing in the New York Review of Books, and reprinted by permission at Tom Dispatch, Powers indicts George Tenet for, well, mistake of the probably "inexcusable" kind.
...Mistakes are one thing, excusable even when serious; inexcusable would be charges of collusion in deceiving Congress and the public to make war possible. Tenet's overriding goal in his carefully written book is to deny "that we somehow cooked the books" about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. If he says it once he says it a dozen times. "We told the president what we did on Iraq WMD because we believed it."
But repetition is not enough. Tenet's problem is that the intelligence and the war proceeded in lockstep: no intelligence, no war. Since Tenet delivered the (shockingly exaggerated) intelligence, and the President used it to go to war, how is Tenet to convince the world that he wasn't simply giving the boss what he wanted? Tenet naturally dislikes this question but it is evident that the American public and Congress dislike it just as much. Down that road lie painful truths about the character and motives of the President and the men and women around him.
Powers then walks us through every step of the way, from early meetings with British officials, to Cheney's unseemly visits to the CIA to add pressure, to dealing with Blair's doubts, to warnings from intelligence analysts about the unreliability of sources, to Powell's personal weakness and disgrace, to the trumping up of documents in the matter of Niger yellowcake, to warnings from European intelligence agencies about false intelligence, and to the horrified reactions from stalwart inspects, like Hans Blix and El Baradei.
Through it all, Tenet "didn't see" or "didn't hear" an awful lot of intelligence which countered the administration's search for justifications. Tenet, in fact, probably should be in jail by now, that dulling medal of freedom dangling around his neck. Maybe Powers' article will cause enough of a stir for Congress to take notice.
Thomas Powers concludes we aren't going to find our way out of Iraq unless we face how we got into Iraq.
...Getting out of Iraq will not be easy, and the necessary first step is to find the civic courage to insist on knowing how we got in. Tenet's memoir is an excellent place to begin; some of what he tells us and much that he leaves out point unmistakably to the genesis of the war in the White House -- the very last thing Tenet wants to address clearly. He sidles up to the question at last on page 301: "One of the great mysteries to me," he writes, "is exactly when the war in Iraq became inevitable."
What Tenet doesn't want to remember is that on September 12, 2001, Iraq was not merely a crazy idea in Richard Perle's and Paul Wolfowitz's heads, but was already part of official strategy. It but remained for a pliant CIA director to come up with the goods. Tenet obliged.
Update 6/30/07: Christine Shelton, intelligence analyst, writes in the Washington Post about Tenet's equivocations and dishonesty, but from a somewhat different vantage point.