What strikes me this morning about the announced changes at the top of command is the focus on Baghdad's periphery.
This would seem to mean that we will be putting our weight behind the Maliki/Sadr regime in spite of the fine statements about "reconciliation and reconstruction," and dumping any thought of a balanced democracy. Or is a Sadr-Sunni alliance actually possible?
Juan Cole is frustrated by the fact that finally real pros are being brought in to lead. In "The Adults Take Charge," he writes:
I'm stricken with a case of the "what ifs" and "if onlys"! What if Gates had been at the Pentagon in 2003 and Petraeus had been in charge of the US military in Iraq and Crocker had been there instead of Paul Bremer? These are competent professionals who know what they are doing. Gates is clear-sighted enough to tell Congress that the US is not winning in Iraq, unlike his smooth-talking, arrogant and flighty predecessor. Petraeus is among the real experts on counter-insurgency, and did a fine job of making friends and mending fences when he was in charge of Mosul. Crocker has been ambassador to Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon and Pakistan, and knows the region intimately (as does Khalilzad). Bremer had been ambassador to . . . Holland. Despite all the talk of the resurgence of the Neoconservatives with their "surge" (actually ramped up occupation) plan, this team is the farthest from Neoconservative desires that you could possibly get.
So. What about Afghanistan? Afghanistan seems all but forgotten.
Yours truly,
Tentatively optimistic but puzzled
