Excerpt from an interview with James Risen, New York Times reporter who, with colleague Eric Lichtblau, first wrote about the extra-legal NSA domestic surveillance program:
Q: You suggest in your book that you think members of the Bush administration intentionally did not tell the President about interrogation techniques so the President would have deniability.
Risen: Yes. What I was told was that the CIA Inspector General's staff was told that the President was not formally briefed on the details of the interrogation techniques and that Vice President Cheney and Condoleezza Rice and a few other senior aides were briefed but there was a sense that you didn't want to go into the Oval Office and go into graphic detail about the specific techniques. I think there are people at the CIA who later regretted that they didn't look the President in the eye and go over these in detail.
Q: Why do you think they regretted it?
Risen: Well, because now it's a big controversy over the use of harsh interrogation techniques and the torture debate and the debate over secret prisons. Although they did get the... The Administration approved these techniques. The question really is not over their approval, it's more a matter of did the President want some kind of deniability so he could go out and say, I never authorized torture. And I think one of the issues for the CIA -- the CIA was the only agency that actually got such high level approval for the actions it was taking. But the techniques that were used there were somehow... one of the things that I've been interested in understanding is how it began to use harsh interrogation techniques first against Al Qaeda captives in CIA custody, and then six months or a year later we end up having a scandal in a military-run facility in Iraq where there's questions about interrogation techniques. The question that's never adequately been answered is, did something migrate away from CIA to the military -- or how did that all happen, where suddenly for the first time in modern history the US military is being accused of such broad mistreatment of prisoners.
Q: I want to ask you about another program that you write about in your book, State of War. And this relates to something in the news right now which is that Iran is continuing with its nuclear program in spite of protests from the international community. You wrote about a program called "Merlin." What was this program?
Risen: Back in 2000 -- six years ago -- the CIA arranged for a Russian defector to give nuclear blueprints to the Iranians. They were supposedly flawed blueprints. The idea behind the operation was to try to get the Iranians to build a nuclear weapon based on these flawed blueprints and it would be a dud. But the operation was considered not to have been handled well, and it's not clear whether actually the blue prints aided the Iranians rather than set them back. So there have been questions raised about how effective and how well-managed this was.
Q: Because this is supposed to be blueprints with flaws to mislead them, but some of the information in them was real information. Tell the story about how the mistake was probably corrected [laughter] by mistake!
Risen: What I was told was that the Russian defector could tell immediately that there were flaws in the blue prints and that he was not supposed to know that these were flawed...
Q: This is the Russian defector who was supposed to be leaving these plans for the Iranians to see...
Risen: ...Right. And so the question raised was, if he could see it and he even sent the Iranians a letter saying you'll see -- I forget the exact wording of the letter -- you'll see there are problems and you'll need to get more help, or something like that. So the question is, were the Iranians able to parse these designs and find the good stuff and get rid of the bad stuff. They have plenty of Russian and Chinese nuclear scientists who consult with them and who could have helped them with this. And even more important, AQ Khan and his network gave the Iranians nuclear blue prints on their own some time ago. This operation was probably irrelevant to the larger debate, but it showed -- what I thought it showed was -- it raised real questions about the CIA's handling of WMD intelligence and whether or not they really know what they're doing. Especially after Iraq, after we've seen how wrong they were about everything about Iraq's weapons programs.